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C·ase No. 8251 MAY, 6 1955 
LA~i· Ut~Mi-1 
U. ef U, · 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
- __ .~,;~::~; 
:··/,,),'!"';:.-., 
MAXINE D. LIND,SAY, 
A. P'P elloot, 
-vs.-
ECCLES HO·TEL COMPANY, a cor-
poration, doing business under the 
trade name and style of Hotel Ben 
Lomond, 
Responitent. 
RESPOND·ENT''·S· BRIEF 
LEROY B. YO·UNG 
of YouNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN 
.Attorneys for Resp1ondent 
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IN THE SUPREME COUR.T 
of the 
S'TATE OF UTAH 
MAXINE D. LIND·SA Y, 
Appellant, 
-vs.-
ECCLES HO·TEL COMPANY, ·a cor-
poration, doing business under the 
trade name and style of Hotel Ben 
Lomond, 
Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF F'ACTS 
Respondent deems it advisable to enlarge so1newhat 
on the Statement of Facts set forth in Appellant's Brief. 
The Coffee Shop in question is located south of and ad-
jacent to the Lobby of the I-Iotel Ben IJomond. There is 
an entrance from the street and also an entrance from the 
Lobby of the Hotel. In the west half of the Coffee Shop 
there is a counter with revolving stools and the waitress-
es serve the patrons water from a fountain back of this 
counter (Tr. 47). 
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In the rear or east half of the Coffee Shop proper 
are two rows of tables large enough to accommodate 
four people to a table. There \Vas no booths and the 
tables were siltuated against each wall, with sufficient 
roo1n ~between to allow for two chairs on each side. 'l1he 
tables on the north side extended back to the rear wall. 
The tables on the south side did not extend back to the 
rear wall. ·The space thereby left open was where the 
waitresses obtained water to serve the customers at the 
tables. There was an aisle approximately four feet wide 
reserved between the rows of tables which lead to the 
kitchen at the rear. Entrance to the kitchen was made 
through two swinging doors at the end of the aisle. 
For convenience in operation one waitress was as-
signed to take care of the customers at the counter; one 
waitress took c.are of the customers a.t the tables on the 
south side and a third waitress took care of the custo-
mers at the taJbles on the north side. 
There was constructed at the rear, on the south side, 
where no table was placed, a water founltain which con-
sisted of a curved neck. This fountain was used by the 
two waitresses at the tables. When customers were 
seated, the waitress went to this fountain, obtained 
glasses and placed ice therein and 'then filled them with 
water to within a inch of the top, and placed them on the 
table for use by the customers. Thereafter ~the glasses 
were never touched by the waitresses until after the 
patron had finished their meals. If additional water was 
needed during the course of the meal, the waitress filled 
the glasses fro1n a pitcher at the tahle. 
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On the 22nd of J'une, 1948 appellant and a friend en-
tered the Coffee Shop and were seated by the hostess, 
Mrs. McGahy, at or near the rear table on the south side. 
Appellant took a seat near the south wall, that is the seat 
fartherest from the aisle. Her companion took her seat 
on the oppos~te side of the table in the same position. 
(See Plaintiff's Dep. 3 and 4; also, Mr. West's testimony, 
23; and Miss Wahlstrom's testimony, 49.) That left the 
spaces neareslt to the aisle unoccupied. Irene Wahlstrom 
was the waitress assigned to serve then1. She testified 
in behalf of the defendant ( Tr. 38 to 65). She stated posi-
tively that she did not touch the glasses after they were 
placed by her on the table (Tr. 4G); that she did not spill 
any water on the floor (Tr. 47); that she did not see any 
water on 1the floor; and that she walked up and down the 
aisle from the kitchen to the table she was serving. She 
further testified that the floor was cleaned every evening 
after closing hours; that it had never been waxed to her 
knowledge (Tr. 51); that during the three years that she 
had worked there, she never knew of any one slipping 
on the floor. The floor was covered with \vhat is known 
as Ceramic tile; it had never been replaced or changed 
since the hotel was constructed in about 1928. There wa~ 
no evidence or no contention that the floor was worn or 
rendered in any way unsafe because of wear. 
Mr. Garrison, who has been in the floor covering 
business for twenty years, testified that Ceramic tile is 
slippery when wet. He admitted, however, that Cerarnie 
tile is in constant use in showers, entrance ways, lava-
tories. In fact, he admitted on eross exatnination that 
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Ceramic tile was placed in the lavatories in the ne\v Ci't~· 
and County Building here in Ogden and that it is being 
used in new buildings in Ogden and i~ a type conRtantly 
and universally used ( Tt. 13). 
Mrs. McGahy, the hostess, whose deposition was of-
fered by the plaintiff, testified that this floor was alwayB 
kept clean, that the manage1nent was very particular 
about that; that there was no polish on the floor. When 
asked sp·ecifically if she had ever slipped on the floor, 
she answered "well, sometin1es, when I was behind the 
counter or something like that. I had maybe slipped a 
little bit but never had I fallen or anything like that. 
We were particular. We tried to keep that so this thing 
wouldn't happ~en." (Dep. 7 and 8) 
It is to be noted that she stated that she might have 
slipp·ed while behind the counter but there is no evidence 
that any waitress or customer ever slipped while using 
or walking upon the places reserved for use by customers 
or waitresses. All of the evidence which has been pre-
sented to this court states very definitely that plaintiff 
fell as she arose from her chair so that it is fairly well 
established that she did not slip in the aisle at all but 
rather slipped when she was still in the area occupied by 
the tables. 
We think this evidence very important because it is 
established thalt if there was any water on the floor, it 
was at or near the place where the plaintiff was seated 
and the water could have been spilled, if there was any 
\Vater so Rpillerl, by the plaint~ff herself while seated at 
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the table as she admit1ted that she used the glass and 
drank water during the course of her meal. If any water 
was in fact spilled on the floor it was a very s1nall 
amount. 
At the conclusion of plaintiff's case, defendant 
moved for dismissal which vvas overruled. Defendant then 
offered its evidence and both sides reslted. Defendant 
again moved the court for a dismissal of the action. The 
court, in accordance with the new rules, took this Motion 
under advisement and submitted the ease to the jury (Tr. 
006). The jury were unable to agree on a verdict and 
were discharged ( Tr. 007). 
Thereafter defendant filed its Motion for Judgment 
notwithstanding the discharge of the jury as provided by 
Rule 41 (2) B, and the court granted the motion (Tr. 
010). 
Thereafter plain tiff filed a Motion to reconsider 
and set aside the ruling of the court or, in the alternative, 
to grant a new trial. This Motion was based solely upon 
the affidavit of one Eleanor McFarlane Evertsen (Tr. 
011). 
Thereaflter the court entered a minute entry denying 
said Motion (Tr. 012). 
ARGUMENT 
We shall endeavor to answer briefly and in order 
the Statement of Points set forth on page 6 of Plaintiff's 
Brief. 
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POINT 1. 
ERROR OF THE COURT IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE DIS-
CHARGE OF THE JURY. 
Counsel for Appellant relie~ upon the decision of thi:-; 
Court in the case of, 
Ericksen v. Walgr.een Dru.g Co., ______ TTL 
------, 
232 P. (2d) 210. 
A rnere reading of this will disclose that the fact~ 
are so dissitnilar that it seeu1s to us that the ('aHe is of 
little or no assistance. 
The Walgreen case involved an entirely different 
situaation. r_rhere the tile in quesltion was under an open 
canopy leading fron1 the sidewalk to the main entrance 
of the building. The tile had become worn and had lost 
1nuch of its character designed to prevent slipping. The 
accident occurred on a rainy day when this area was 
con1pletely vvet. It 'vas also sloping so as to render the 
s~une unsafe. 
In this case the accident happened on the 22nd day 
of June, 1948. The weather was dry. Counsel contend 
that defendant was negligent ·because it did not place 
1na ts in the aisle. There are two answers to this charge: 
:B-,irs1t, there is no evidence that the aisle was slippery and 
second the evidence is that the plaintiff slipped near 
where she 'vas sitting and not in the aisle at all. It is of 
course axiomatic that the defendant is not an insurer of 
the safety of its guests. It is only required to exercise 
reasonable care to see that the premises are reasonably 
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safe. Had the accident occurred during stormy weather 
and had it appeared that customers entering the building 
brought in water on their shoes or cldthes which fell on 
the floor, thereby making it slippery, as in the Walgreen 
case, a different situation might present itself but here 
the defendant was extra cautious in not allowing or per-
mitting the floor to become wet and there is no contention 
that the floor was slippery or dangerous when wet. 
Respondent relies principally upon the case of, 
Jens.en v. Kress, 49 P. (2d) 958, 87 Utah 434. 
We assert with full confidence that this case is on all 
fours with the case in question. Mr. Justice Wolfe, in 
writing the opinion of the court, says : 
"There was no evidence as to how the glass 
got cracked or how long it had been cracked be-
fore the plaintiff was cut by it. 
"Again, in both cases (ref. to the Quinn case) 
the cause of the spilled ink or broken glass may 
have been caused by the customer who vvas danl-
aged or by another customer, or rnay have been 
caused by some representative of the company 
wit.hout negligence and witho·ut negligence and 
unnoticed when it was done. 
"Again, in the instant case it was just as con-
sistent that the plaintiff herself or son1e other 
customer had leaned against the show case and 
thus split off a piece of glass as if the defendant 
had done it negligently." 
Again, in commenting on the case of Ober ·o. The 
Golden Rule, Mr. Justice Wolfe says: 
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·r91U n9vr ~tfLI'he ;e~eiw.dulft,berp:arollelito the instant case 
·\) rriLilht~~!f9~·}?Jir~P.9.}V)l that the con1pany broke this 
7ro H~l~~~~ Pi::skne~ it to be in s~ch condition and allow-
ed ~1i! to rema1n so. Then 1n each case there would 
'be an act or omission attributable to the company. 
Under the evidence of this case the breaking 1nay 
or may not be attributable to the co1npany.'' 
In this case there is no evidence before this court 
as to 
(a.) Who spilled the water. 
It is just as consistent to assume that the plaintiff 
spilled the water as it is to a.ssu1ne that some employee 
of the company spilled it. After the glass of water was 
placed on her table, no agent or employee of the defend-
ant ever touched the glass. But, on the contrary, the 
plaintiff drank from the glass during the course of the 
meal. And 
(b) There is no evidence as to how long the water 
re1nained on the floor. 
The evidence is conclusive that there was no water 
on the floor when the plaintiff was seated at the table 
not 1nore than one-half hour before the accident. If there 
'vas 'vater on the floor, it may have been placed there 
within minutes or seconds before the plaintiff slipped. 
And, assuming, for the sake of argument, that a waitress 
accidentally did in fact spill the water, there is no evi-
dence that the wai tess knew that she had in fact spilled 
any water and if such was the case, the spilling of the 
water by a waitress would not be negligence. 
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Again, reverting to Mr. Justice Wolfe's statement: 
"'or rnay have been caused by some representative of the 
co1npany vvithout negligence and unnoticed when it was 
done," if such vvas the case, then the defendant would 
not be liable in the absence of evidence showing that the 
\Vater had been on the floor for a sufficient length of time 
to have constituted notice and an opportunity to remedy 
the situation. 
The Jensen case has been cited with approval by 
1nany courts and it has never been modified or in any 
1nanner ·criticized by this court. 
It is proba~bly unnecessary to cite cases from other 
jurisdictions. We might however cite the following cases 
which are in harmony with the Jensen case: 
Rossburg v. M ont.gomery Ward & Co., (~lont.) 
99 P. (2d) 979; 
Crawford v. Pac. State Sav. & Laan Co. (Cal.) 71 
Pac. (2d) 333; 
Zampor v. U.S. Smelt. & Refiln. Co. (lOth Circuit) 
206 F. (2d) 171. 
While not directly in point, yet we think the case of, 
Jordan v Coca Cola Bottling Co., 117 Utah 578, 
218 Pac. ( 2d) 660. 
also sustains our position. In this case and the recent 
case of, 
Devine v. Cook, ______ Utah------, 279 Pac. (2d) 1073. 
both interesting cases involving the law of negligence 
and especially its causes, that if several inferences may 
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be deduced from the evidence, one of which inferenceR 
may support a conclusion of negligence but the other 
inference would not support n~ligence, then the court 
cannot permit the jury to speculate on the question o!' 
negligence. 
In our case we re-assert what was stated in the Coca 
Cola case· and in the Devine case that it is just as consist-
ent that the water was spilled, if there was any water 
spilled on the floor, by some one else as it is to conclude 
that it was knowingly spilled by a waitress. Therefore, 
the jury could not speculate on this question. 
We assert therefore that the court was clearly right 
when he granted defendant's Motion for Judgment not-
withstanding the Discharge of the jury. 
POINT 2. 
THAT THE GRANTING OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
WAS ·CONTRARY TO LAW. 
We have fully covered this matter in our discussion 
under Point 1. 
POINT 3. 
REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO ADMIT IN EVIDENCE 
THE SWORN AFFIDAVIT OF LILLIAN McGARY, "EXHIBIT 
ONE" OF THE DEPOSITION OF LILLIAN McGARY, AND 
IN STRIKING PARTS OF THE DEPOSITION FROM THE 
EVIDENCE. 
Counsel for plaintiff assert that the witness Lillian 
McGahy was an adverse witness. We contend that there 
is absolutely no evidence in this record on appeal from 
10 
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\vhich such a conclusion could be assumed. True, the 
record sho\vs that she \Vas ordered by subpoena to testify 
but the fact of being adverse can not be inferred frorn 
this fact but quite apart frorn that, the affidavit wa~ 
elearly hearsay evidence. It \vas not rendered under con-
ditions \\'hich \Vould perrnit its declarations to be a part 
of the res gestae. 
Counsel frankly adrnit that their associate counsel 
vvho took the deposition did not attempt to lay any found-
ation for irnpeachrnent nor did he lay any foundation to 
shovv that the waitress vvas in any manner hostile. Coun-
sel say ··she had becorne a hostile \Vitness. She not only 
refused to return to Utah to testify but refused to appear 
for the purpose of taking her deposition until compelled 
to do so.'' 1~here is no evidence in this record that she 
refused to return to Utah to testify nor is there any evi-
dence that she refused to appear for the purpose of tak-
ing her deposition until compelled to do so but if she did, 
that did not prove her a hostile \vitness. Counsel admit 
that they can find no authority to sustain their position 
that the court erred in not allowing the affidavit to be 
introduced in evidence. And in passing it rnust be noted 
that the offer of the affidavit was not made for the pur-
pose of impeaclnnent but it is contended by counsel that 
the statements contained in the affidavit should havf" 
been submitted as evidence from which the jury could 
find negligence. Clearly, as stated by the court in the 
J(ress v. tT en sen case, declarations of an agent, rnade long 
after the happening of the event, are not adrnissihle 
against the principal in the absence of a showing that the 
11 
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agent had authority to bind the principal. We pass this 
1natter without further com1nent. 
POINT 4. 
REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO GRANT PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND SET ASIDE DEFEND-
ANT'S "MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
DISCHARGE OF THE JURY"; AND TO IMPANEL A NEW 
JURY AND SET CASE FOR TRIAL; OR, IN THE ALTERNA-
TIVE, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
Counsel boldy state appellant's i\1otion for new Trial 
was based primarily upon the supporting affidavit of 
one Eleanor McFarlane Evertsen and should have been 
granted on the theory that it was newly discovered evi-
dence, material for the party making the application 
which he could not with reasonable diligence ha~ve dis-
covered and produoed at the trial. (See pages 10 and 11 
of Appellant's Brief.) 
They further state, on page 11, counsel spent time 
and effort in trying to locate a Mrs. Davidson but na-
turally were unsuccessful when the true name of the 
witness was made known to appellants' attorney they 
undertook to find her and finally located her in Salt Lake 
City, By that time the jury had been called, the trial date 
definitely fixed and the trial about to begin. Counsel 
talked to her husband by telephone during each of the 
two days immediately preceding the trial and were in-
formed by her husband that she was ill in bed and could 
not possibly ap·pear." 
12 
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We submit that this statement by counsel is wholly 
outside the record; that there is no evidence presented 
to this· court to support the foregoing statement. 
Counsel further state the ''court had previously 
emphatically stated that there would be no more continu-
ances of the case and that it would either be tried or 
dismissed on that date so that counsel did not feel justi-
fied in asking for another continuance and thereby incur-
ring the ill will of the court, particularly when counsel 
did not know whether the testunony of Mrs. Evertsen 
would be material or Inerely cumulative. Moreover, to 
have made a motion for a further continuance would have 
been a futile thing and such a 1notion would have been 
denied by the trial court. He had expressed definite 
impatience in that no more continuances would have been 
granted and would not have called off the jury at that 
late date. Of this counsel for appellant was then and 
are now convinced." (Pages 11 and 12, Tr.) 
Again, we must remind this court that there is not 
a scintilla of evidence, transcribed or presented to this 
court to sustain this state1nent. It is however interesting 
to note that this case was filed on the 8th day of June, 
1949 and that it was not tried until the 7th of May, 1954, 
or practically five years after the filing of the co1nplaint. 
On the question of diligence, it is further interestin~ 
to note: 
That plaintiff's counsel failed to explain what dili-
gence was undertaken during this whole five year period 
to find this witness who adn1ittedly was a friend of the 
13 
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plaintiff and it is further interesting not note how quick-
ly, after the granting of this 1notion, plaintiff's counsel 
were able to locate this witness in Salt Lake City. They 
admit that this was not newly discovered evidence, that 
they learned of this witness at least two days before trial 
but they say they did not know whether her evidence 
was cumulative or not. What kind of diligence is that1 
Then they say that the court had announced that 
he would grant no further continuances. We have already 
alluded to the fact that there is no evidence in this record 
which supports this statement but even if it is true, it 
seems to us that counsel for plaintiff not only lacked 
diligence but were guilty of the grossest kind of negli-
gence in not calling the rna tter to the attention of the 
trial court. 
Even assuming that the trial court had been im-
patient because of repeated continuances, yet, it seen1s to 
us, that counsel was certainly derelict in not asking for 
a continuance and to impute to the trial court that he 
would not have listened to their plea had they made a 
p.rop~er. showing is to impute to the trial judge motives 
quite contrary to our experience with the fine judges of 
the State of Utah. 
Counsel admit that this court can not review the 
action of the trial court in granting or denying a motion 
for a new trial except only upon a showing of an abuse 
of discretion. It seems rather difficult to claim or even 
assert, under the facts of this case, tha·t the trial court 
\vas guilty of an abuse of discretion reviewable by this 
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court in denying their motion, when counsel admit that 
for at least two days prior to the date of trial they kne'v 
of this witness and had apparently made no effort to 
interview her and certainly never called the matter to the 
attention of the trial court at a time "\vhen they should 
have done so but chose to rely upon the trial of the case 
without this testi1nony, hoping to use it as a means of 
obtaining a second trial should the verdict be rendered 
against them. This certainly is not the diligence which 
is required to support a rnotion for a new trial and cer-
tainly the denial of the n1otion did not constitute an 
abuse of discretion. 
Respondent contends that the motion for judgment 
was properly granted and that the denial of the motion 
for a new trial was properly overruled. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LEROY B. YOUNG 
of YouNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN 
Attorneys for Respor~Adent 
1ri 
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